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Kate Reinmuth

PhD Candidate at Stanford Department of Economics

I'm a 5th-year PhD candidate in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. My research uses tools from labor and IO to study how market frictions and institutional constraints, including labor mobility restrictions, non-price rationing, and firm policies, shape outcomes for workers, consumers, and firms.

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You can reach me at: reinmuth@stanford.edu​​​​.

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I also completed my JD at Stanford Law School in 2025, which informs my research through engagement with antitrust, intellectual property, contract, and labor law.​

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My work is supported by Knight-Hennessy ScholarsStanford Impact Labs, and the John M. Olin Program.​

20241112-SLS-Katie Reinmuth 4_edited_edi

Photo by Scott MacDonald

Selected Work in Progress​

Consumer Welfare and Misallocation in Panic Buying of Gasoline with Katja Hofmann

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Disclosures, Deals, and Dollars: A Survey of Management Practices in University Technology Transfer Offices with Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Daniela Scur, and Heidi Williams

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The Leaky Pipeline: Retention, Performance, and Promotion Policies with Brian Higgins

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Econ Publications

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Innovation through Inventor Mobility: Evidence from Non-Compete Agreements (AEJ: Applied, Forthcoming) with Emma Rockall

[link to replication package]

Proponents of labor mobility restrictions argue that innovation incentives more than offset harm to workers. Yet the causal effect of such policies on innovation is an open empirical question. Leveraging plausibly exogenous state-level changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements, we find a significant negative effect on innovation. This effect is even larger for the most novel and innovative patents and firms. Further analysis shows that these negative effects on innovation cannot be explained by entry alone and instead likely result from reduced knowledge flows. Our findings suggest that labor mobility plays a crucial role in spreading knowledge across firms.

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Law Review Publications

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Striking the Balance: University Commercialization and Scientific Research Productivity (Stanford J. of Law, Econ., and Bus., 2025) 

University-based discoveries that drive economic growth are a natural byproduct of scientific research. However, many of these inventions never realize their full potential value because they “languish” in universities and never diffuse to the broader economy. University technology license agreements are critical tools for idea diffusion. However, some fear that giving scientists more commercial responsibilities will crowd out core scientific tasks like basic research. To assess these competing viewpoints, this Note investigates the impact of university technology licensing on scientists’ academic research performance at Stanford University, finding that licensing significantly increases the number of papers that a scientist publishes and providing a promising indication of the complementarity of academic research and technology transfer.

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Default Difficulties: Merchants' Reliance on Default Rules that Harm Consumers (Stanford Law Review, 2025) 

This Note investigates how incomplete contracting between merchant parties may harm third-party consumers. After defining this phenomenon and noting several examples, this Note considers solutions to the social inefficiencies arising from these merchant-to-merchant contracts. To do so, this Note engages in a detailed case study of generic drug shortages and how incomplete failure-to-supply provisions affect patients’ ability to access essential drugs. Such shortages typify the incomplete contracts at issue in this Note. Ultimately, this Note proposes a regulatory solution to firms’ reliance on default rules that would reduce the incidence of extreme negative externalities on third parties.

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Other Publications

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Turnover, Loyalty and Competence in the West Wing: The Trump White House in Historical Context (Pres. Studies Quarterly, 2021) with Matthew Dickinson

Pundits and scholars alike point to the high rates of administrative chaos and staff turnover in the Trump White House, but prior research has not been able to pin down the cause(s) empirically. In this paper, we develop a survival model and conduct a Bayesian latent trait analysis to examine the tenure rates of White House aides serving presidents Nixon through Trump. We find that, compared to his presidential predecessors, Trump′s White House stands out for its lack of personally loyal aides. This is not surprising given that his pre-presidential career would not have allowed him to develop the cadre of political loyalists that typically accompanied his predecessors into the West Wing. Nonetheless, we show that it was this lack of personal loyalty among his staff, and not any shortcoming in competence, that led to high rates of turnover.

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Change and Continuity in White House Staffing: The Trump Factor (De Gruyter, 2021) with Matthew Dickinson

Early assessments of Trump’s White House portrayed an organization riven by personality disputes and administrative chaos. But in many ways, Trump’s White House staff descriptively bears a strong resemblance to its predecessors, as we demonstrate by drawing on more than 50 years of data on presidential staff composition. In terms of size, structure, and the distributions of functions, the Trump White House represents not a break with the past so much as its continuation. Trump’s staffing patterns departed from precedent more in the areas of staff turnover and recruitment; however, it is not clear just how significant those changes are.

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Trump, Congress, and Health Care: All Politics Is National (De Gruyter, 2017) with Matthew Dickinson

John McCain’s dramatic early-morning “no” vote may have been the immediate cause of the Republican failure to repeal and replace Obamacare. However, Republicans undertook this endeavor from a weak political vantage point. The 2016 elections gave Republicans very little margin for error in Congress – a margin threatened by Trump’s inexperience and lack of political capital. Longer-term trends, including the polarization of the two congressional parties against the backdrop of increasingly nationalized elections, exacerbated this situation by leaving Trump and Republicans little choice but to legislate through their own party caucus – or to not legislate at all.​​

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